Status: Fixed in v1.14.0-alpha
Fixed by: PR #1497
Discovered by: Anatolij Vasilev (tolik518)
Last vulnerable version/state: v1.13.0-alpha / main@ba18ec20d332069db4e1c187f28191fb0d9ef2ed
Disclosure status: Reported to maintainers before publication
CVE: pending / not assigned
0. Summary
Anyone with an account on any AT Protocol server can access HTTP servers on localhost of the tangled instance.
The root cause is that the knotmirror proxy trusts a user-supplied field (knot) from an AT Protocol record as a literal URL, then makes an outbound HTTP GET to it from the mirror server itself.
By pointing that field (for example) at http://127.0.0.1:7200/repos, the server fetches its own unauthenticated internal admin panel and returns the response to the attacker. That way the attacker can access any internal HTTP services like Admin panels, Grafana dashboards or any other service that is not protected by authentication but only by network isolation.
Confirmed via limited proof-of-concept test against production on 2026-05-08. No destructive actions were performed. Accessed data contained…
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